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Abstract 
 
The new generations of SRAM-based FPGA 
devices, built on nanometer technology, are the 
preferred choice for the implementation of 
reconfigurable computing platforms. However, 
smaller technological scales increase their 
vulnerability to manufacturing imperfections and 
hence to the occurrence of electromigration. 
Moreover, the large internal RAM (for configuration 
purposes or as embedded memory blocks) makes 
them more prone to soft errors. 
The incorporation of self-reconfiguration 
capabilities in recent FPGAs, allied to the use of soft 
and hard microprocessor cores, facilitates the offset 
of these vulnerabilities by enabling the development 
of self-restoring fault tolerant reconfigurable 
systems. In the methodology presented in this paper, 
the embedded microprocessor is also responsible for 
the implementation of online self-test-and-repair 
strategies, based on modular redundancy and on 
self-reconfiguration. The detection of faults, caused 
by soft or hard errors, may be followed by repairing 
actions, depending on the fault type. This approach 
leads to smoother system degradation, extending its 
lifetime and improving its reliability. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The reduction in size of the transistors in each 
new generation of semiconductor technology led to a 
greater integration and to a per unit power reduction, 
enabling chips to grow in size and complexity. But 
new nanometer scales also brought some negative 
aspects, such as a greater vulnerability to 
manufacturing imperfections and to soft errors, due 
to Single Event Upsets (SEU) originating in 
background radiation. Soft errors do not physically 
damage the chip, but the values stored in memory 
cells may be affected. In contrast, manufacturing 
imperfections may lead to the occurrence of 
electromigration, which may result in permanent 
physical damages to the chip after large periods of 
operation. 
These problems have a particular impact on the 
reliability of SRAM-based Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGAs). The exponential growing on the 
amount of memory cells needed for configuration 
purposes makes these components especially 
vulnerable to soft errors. Moreover, the amount of 
embedded memory blocks available for user’s 
applications has also been growing. 
The recent addition of new features, such as 
dynamic reconfiguration and self-reconfiguration, 
may help to cope with the previous problems, in 
particular when dealing with critical applications 
that require a high reliability level. Dynamic 
reconfiguration extends FPGA’s flexibility by 
enabling multiple independent functions, from 
different applications, to share the same logic 
resources in the spatial and temporal domain [1]. 
More recently, and via self-reconfiguration [2], it 
became possible for an implemented function to 
control the dynamic reconfiguration of its own 
FPGA. 
The advantages of using dynamic 
reconfiguration in the implementation of online 
structural test and fault tolerance strategies were 
largely explored in previous works [3, 4]. However, 
those approaches relied on a rotate and test 
methodology, which created a test latency that 
degraded the performance of the test strategy. If a 
defect affects the functionality of a given function, 
the resulting fault will be propagated to the rest of 
the circuit until the test function has reached the 
defective resource. By then, the fault could already 
have caused the irreversible malfunctioning of the 
whole system, eventually interrupting its operation. 
Traditionally, highly critical applications relied 
on hardware redundancy, like Triple Modular 
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Redundancy (TMR), illustrated in figure 1, to 
increase their reliability. In this method, extra 
components are used to instantaneously mask the 
effect of a faulty component, meaning that no 
propagation of the fault will occur. Each module 
may be a complete system, such as a computer, or a 
less complex unit, like a microprocessor or even an 
adder or a gate. The voting element accepts the 
outputs from the three sources and delivers the 
majority vote at its output. 
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Fig. 1. Triple Modular Redundancy 
In this case, it is assumed that the majority voter 
does not fail, which is an unrealistic principle. 
However, its reliability can be improved by 
replicating it as well. 
In new nanometre technology the use of fault 
tolerance mechanisms is essential, not only due to 
SEU induced errors, but because it is unrealistic to 
expect that a manufacturing test will cover all 
possible faults. In particular, delay faults emerging 
from defects of resistive type, or due to crosstalk or 
ground bounce, are almost impossible to foresee [5]. 
The inclusion of spatial or temporal redundancy 
leads to an increase in the reliability level of a 
system. However, its cost rises enormously, not only 
in terms of the direct cost of components and space 
required for its implementation, but also in terms of 
power consumption. Reconfigurability is one way of 
improving the reliability of a system without 
implying a proportional rise in costs. 
A new methodology to increase the reliability of 
systems implemented in dynamically reconfigurable 
FPGAs is presented in the next sections, followed by 
the discussion of several aspects related to its 
practical implementation. Future research lines are 
presented in the concluding section. 
 
2. SEU effects over FPGAs 
 
In non-reconfigurable technologies, such as 
ASICs, the protection against SEUs is restricted to 
flip-flops, because logic paths between them are 
typically hard-wired. Notwithstanding, Single Event 
Transients (SETs) may be propagated to flip-flop 
inputs, where they have a high probability to be 
registered, causing soft-errors in the user data [6]. 
Further protection would only be achieved through 
full module redundancy. This is also a preferred 
choice to improve the reliability of highly critical 
applications based on FPGAs [7-11]. Due to their 
inherent configurability, FPGAs are especially 
suitable for the implementation of modular 
redundancy, since it does not require any new 
architectural feature and it is function independent. 
However, the dependency on memory cells to define 
logic paths makes them also susceptible to SEUs. 
Again in this case, the only effective protection is 
full module redundancy [8]. 
Possible errors in the on-chip configuration 
memory cells may be recovered by simply 
performing a partial readback operation of the 
configuration of the detected faulty module. The 
retrieved bitstream is compared with the original 
configuration, and if a modification is detected, the 
correct bitstream can be re-established through 
partial reconfiguration. This technique is known as 
scrubbing, and defined as the process of re-writing 
the configuration memory during (and without 
disturbing) normal FPGA operation [12]. 
The circuit that controls the FPGA 
reconfiguration should also have a compatible 
reliability index. This circuit, typically a 
microprocessor, does not need to be a dedicated 
configuration module. Due to the usual long time 
interval between module failures [13], a generic soft 
microprocessor core that carries on other tasks 
related to the operation of the whole system may be 
used. 
The readback and partial reconfiguration do not 
affect the data stored in flip-flop registers, and 
consequently soft-errors in data registers cannot be 
recovered using this method. However, due to the 
transient nature of upsets, the error will be recovered 
by the circuit in the subsequent update of the 
affected flip-flop. The propagation of soft-errors, 
either affecting data registers or the functionality of 
the circuits, is avoided by redundancy. 
 
3. Reliability of circuits in FPGAs 
 
In a discrete implementation of a TMR system, if 
a defect affects the functionality of one module, 
reliability decreases, but the system still works 
correctly. A second failure in one of the remaining 
modules may lead to a malfunctioning of the system. 
Ideally, when a module fails, it should be replaced to 
restore the initial redundancy. However, this action 
may not be possible immediately. In certain cases, 
like in space applications, it may even be 
impossible. 
The great advantage of using FPGAs is that, in 
the event of a module failure, a diagnose-and-repair 
mechanism may be activated and the initial 
redundancy re-established. This may be done 
transparently and without human intervention, since 
physical component replacement is not needed. 
It is not easy to detect a fault in a TMR 
implementation using traditional online test 
strategies, due to the masking properties of 
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redundancy. In our approach, the detection of the 
faulty modules is done through a scan chain that 
regularly captures the values at the outputs of all the 
modules and voters, including those of the 
microprocessor, as shown in figure 2. The resulting 
bitstream is shifted to the microprocessor where it is 
analyzed. If an incoherency is detected, the module 
or voter where it was produced is probably not 
working as expected. 
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Fig. 2. Example of a T-TMR implementation with an 
embedded scan chain for faults detection 
 
4. Detection-Diagnose-and-Repair 
 
If an error is detected in the configuration 
bitstream, it is possible to confine its origin to the 
space between the scan chain cells, corresponding to 
the module or voter where the value was captured, 
and to the interconnections in-between [14]. Three 
possible causes for the fault may be considered: 
1. the faulty value is due to a transient failure 
caused by a SEU or SET affecting one of the 
circuit registers; 
2. the faulty value is due to a transient failure 
caused by a SEU affecting a configuration 
memory cell, which leads to a change in the 
functionality of the module or voter, or the 
interconnections. 
3. the faulty value is due to a permanent 
physical defect affecting the structure of the 
FPGA. 
The first case may be immediately excluded if 
the error is captured at the output of a voter, since 
voters are typically implemented using 
combinational logic only. If it has its origin in a 
module, one can expect that the fault will be 
automatically corrected at the next register update. A 
new scan chain capture operation may show that the 
error has already been fixed and no further action is 
needed. If not, the second situation may have 
occurred. A background task is launched to readback 
part of the configuration bitstream of the area where 
the affected module is implemented. Comparison 
with the original bitstream may be done by bit 
comparison or Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). If 
an incoherency is found, the microprocessor 
performs a partial reconfiguration, restoring the 
original configuration and eliminating the cause of 
the failure. The output of the module should now be 
captured again and its correctness verified. If no 
error on the configuration bitstream is detected after 
the readback-and-compare operation, but the fault 
persists, the most probable reason is the existence of 
a physical defect in the array. In that case, it is 
necessary to reconfigure the module, avoiding the 
faulty area, in order to restore the reliability index. 
The module should be dynamically replicated and its 
operation transferred to the new module. This 
transference should neither affect the operation of 
the function nor introduce disturbances in the output 
signals [1]. After that, the resources occupied by the 
faulty module are released and subsequently tested 
to detect and diagnosis the origin of the fault. This 
procedure is controlled by the microprocessor [3, 4]. 
Any resource found defective is flagged to avoid its 
reuse in later reconfigurations. The remaining 
resources that are tested OK can be reused in later 
replacements of any other faulty module. In this 
way, the available spare resources are almost 
entirely restored for future replacements. Figure 3 
shows the diagram flow of the proposed 
methodology. 
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Fig. 3. Flowchart of the detection-diagnose-and-repair 
methodology proposed 
The use of design diversity, where each 
redundant module is synthesized using a different 
synthesis technique (which leads to different 
implementations of the same logic circuit), further 
enhances reliability. The emergence of possible 
systematic defects in specific parts of the 
configurable logic space may eventually lead to the 
simultaneous failure of more than one module of the 
same function (and consequently of the function 
itself), if all its modules are identical and 
implemented using equal resources [11]. 
This methodology extends the reliability of each 
function and enables a smoother degradation of the 
global reliability index. Despite being a static TMR 
implementation, a faulty module is dynamically 
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repairable n times, where n depends on the cause of 
the failure. If the origin is not a permanent physical 
defect, then n is infinite. Otherwise, n depends on 
the initial amount of spare resources and on the 
location of the defects that affect the structure of the 
FPGA. 
The microprocessor is also implemented using 
TMR to keep its reliability index compatible with 
the remaining blocks. The microprocessor is divided 
in small functional modules, facilitating replacement 
in case of fault detection, and reducing the spare 
space needed for replication. If the defective module 
is part of one of the three implemented processors, 
the remaining two will be responsible for the 
replication of the malfunctioning module. 
Subsequent test procedures will already be assumed 
by the whole three.  
Self-reconfiguration is necessary to embed the 
whole system in a single FPGA, including the self-
tolerance features. The Virtex-II and Virtex-II Pro 
families have an Internal Configuration Access Port 
(ICAP). ICAP enables a hard- or soft- implemented 
microprocessor to control its own dynamic 
reconfiguration or the reconfiguration of any 
external modules, without stopping or disturbing the 
operation of the whole system. In this way, a self-
-healing system may be included in a single FPGA.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Despite the generalized idea that TMR makes 
FPGAs virtually immune to defects or SEUs, further 
research is necessary and several issues related to 
their use in reconfigurable systems have yet to be 
considered, namely the following: 
• the probability of total failure due to a single-
event-functional-interrupt (SEFI), caused by an 
upset in the device Power-On Reset (POR), 
which leads to the total clearing of the 
configuration memory and causes the loss of 
state data; 
• the probability of a fault in a function output due 
to bridging faults between modules; 
• the possibility of an incorrect module or voter 
failure diagnosis caused by defects or upsets 
affecting the scan chain that captures their 
outputs; 
• the vulnerability of the ICAP to defects or 
upsets; 
• the influence, over voter output, of the position 
of replicated modules concerning their original 
location (due to a variation on the path delay 
between modules and voters); 
• the vulnerability of the memory holding the 
original or current configuration file, which must 
also be protected against upsets using error 
checking and correction techniques; 
• the possibility of an upset to change the content 
of the memory block holding the microprocessor 
program, since TMR does not offer any 
protection in case of software errors. 
Work is being done in these issues to prepare the 
experimental stage that will validate the proposed 
methodology. 
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